Several variants of the cops and robbers (CR) game have been studied in the past. In this paper we examine a novel variant, which is played between two cops, each one independently trying to catch a "passive robber". We will call this the Selfish Cops and Passive Robber (SCPR) game. In short, SCPR is a stochastic two-player, zero-sum game where the opponents are the two cop players. We study sequential and concurrent versions of the SCPR game. For both cases we prove the existence of value and optimal strategies and present algorithms for the computation of these.
Introduction
Several variants of the cops and robbers (CR) game have been studied in the past. In this paper we examine a novel variant, which is played between two cops, each one independently trying to catch a "passive robber". We will call this the Selfish Cops and Passive Robber (SCPR) game. Here is a brief and informal description of the game; a more detailed description will be provided in later sections.
1. The game is played on an undirected, finite, simple and connected graph.
2. The game is played by two cop players C 1 and C 2 , each controlling a cop token (the tokens will also be referred to as C 1 and C 2 ).
3. A robber token R is also used, which is controlled by Chance.
4. At every turn of the game the tokens are moved from vertex to vertex, along the edges of the graph.
5. The winner is the first player whose token lies at the same vertex as the robber token (i.e., the player who "captures the robber").
In short, SCPR is a game where the opponents are the two cop players. As far as we know this CR variant has not been previously studied. The study of Cops and Robbers was initiated by Quillot [21] and Nowakowski and Winkler [19] . For the graph theoretic point of the view, the reader can consult the recent book [20] which contains a good overview of the extensive literature. We will study SCPR from a somewhat different angle, using the theory of stochastic games 1 as presented in, e.g., the book by Filar and Vrieze [13] . In the current paper we study qualitative SCPR games, i.e., games in which the payoff is the winning probability; in a forthcoming paper we will discuss quantitative SCPR games, i.e., games in which the payoff is the expected capture time.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present preliminary definitions and notation. In Section 3 we study the sequential version of the SCPR game and in Section 4 the concurrent version. In Section 5 we discuss connections to several other research areas (for instance recursive games, graphical games and reachability games) and in Section 6 we present concluding remarks and discuss future research directions. the set of all finite histories is H = ∪ ∞ n=0 H n . We have already mentioned that each cop player moves his respective token. Rather than specifying each move separately, we assume (as is usual in Game Theory) that before the game starts, each cop player selects a strategy which controls all subsequent moves. Despite the fact that there is no robber player, we will assume that robber movement is also controlled by a "strategy", which has been fixed before the game starts and is known to the cop players. Hence the i-th token (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is controlled by the strategy (conditional probability function):
The above definition is sufficiently general to describe every possible manner of move selection. We will only consider strategies which assign zero probability to illegal moves. The following classes of strategies are of particular interest.
1.
A strategy σ i is called stationary Markovian (or positional ) iff σ i (a|s 0 s 1 ...s t ) = σ i (a|s t ); i.e., the probability of the next move depends only on the current state of the game.
2.
A strategy σ i is called oblivious iff it is stationary Markovian and σ i a| y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , u = σ i a|y i , u ; i.e., the probability of the next move of the token depends only on (i) the current location of the token and (ii) the active player.
3.
A strategy σ i is called deterministic iff, for every s 0 s 1 ...s t ∈ H, σ i (x|s 0 s 1 ...s t ) ∈ {0, 1}; i.e., for every history, the i-th token moves to its next location deterministically.
To simplify presentation, we will often use the following notation for deterministic strategies. We define the deterministic strategy to be a function σ i : H → V , defined as follows: for every finite history s 0 s 1 ...s t , σ i (s 0 s 1 ...s t ) = a, where a is the unique vertex such that σ i (a|s 0 s 1 ...s t ) = 1. If σ i is stationary Markovian, we write σ i (s t ) = a.
Suppose the game is in state s. Now C 1 plays a 1 , C 2 plays a 2 and R's move a 3 is selected according to the (fixed) strategy σ 3 ; hence the game will move into some new state s ′ with a certain probability depending on a 1 , a 2 and σ 3 . We denote this probability by Pr (s ′ |s, a 1 , a 2 ) 4 . Payoff is defined as follows. In each turn of the game, C 1 receives an immediate payoff equal to
for C 1 and −Q (s 0 s 1 ....) for C 2 . Note that both players have an incentive to capture R.
1. If C 1 captures the robber, he receives a total payoff of one (comprising of immediate payoff of one for the capture turn and zero for all other turns); otherwise his total payoff is zero.
2. C 2 never receives positive payoff (even if he captures the robber). However, we have assumed c (G) = 1 and this implies that a single cop can always catch the robber. Hence, if C 2 does not capture R, C 1 will and thus C 2 will receive a negative payoff; this provides the incentive for C 2 to capture R.
Sequential SCPR is a stochastic zero sum game [13] . Each player will try to maximize his expected payoff. Suppose the game starts at position s 0 , C i moves according to strategy σ i (for i ∈ {1, 2}) and R moves according to a fixed and known stratey σ 3 . Every triple (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) induces a probability measure on H ∞ , the set of all infinite game histories. Hence the expected payoff to C 1 is
and is well defined; −J (σ 1 , σ 2 |s 0 ) is the expected payoff to C 2 . It is easily seen that J (σ 1 , σ 2 |s 0 ) = Pr ("C 1 wins"|"the game starts at s 0 and, for i ∈ {1, 2} , C i uses σ i ") .
We always have sup
if the two sides of (4) are equal, we define the value of the game (when started at s 0 ) to be
v will denote the vector of values for all starting states, i.e., v = (v (s)) s∈S . Given some ε ≥ 0, we say that:
A 0-optimal strategy is also called simply optimal.
Finally, let Γ be a matrix game, i.e., a (one-turn) two-player, zero-sum game with finite action set A i for the i-th player and the payoff to the first player being Γ a 1 , a 2 when i-th player plays a i ∈ A i (with i ∈ {1, 2}). As is well known [22] , such a game always has a value, which we will denote by Val Γ a 1 , a 2 .
Concurrent SCPR
Most of the CR literature studies sequential versions of the CR game. However, we have recently introduced a concurrent version of the classic CR [15] . Now we extend concurrency to the SCPR game. The concurrent SCPR game differs from the sequential game in a basic respect: in every turn the C 1 , C 2 , R tokens are moved simultaneously (hence, when making his move, each player does not know the other player's move; note that both of them know R's next move, since σ 3 is known in advance). Once again we will assume, unless otherwise indicated, that c (G) = 1 (note that a graph G has concurrent cop number c (G) = k iff it has sequential, i.e., "classic", cop number c (G) = k [15] ).
In addition, in concurrent SCPR we can have "en-passant capture", in which a cop and the robber start at opposite ends of the same edge and move in opposite directions; in this case the robber is "swept" by the cop and moved into the cop's destination.
With concurrent movement, game states are vectors x 1 , x 2 , x 3 where x i ∈ V indicates (as previously) the position of the i-th token; the u variable is no longer necessary, since all tokens are moved in every turn. Capture states now have the form x 1 , x 2 , x 3 with either x 1 = x 3 or x 2 = x 3 (or both) and the definition and behavior of the terminal state τ are the same as previously. For the state space, we define
and S is the full state space of the of concurrent SCPR game.
Regarding A i (s) (the actions available to the i-th player when the game state is s) we always have
i . The definitions of (finite and infinite) histories and strategies are the same as in the sequential case, except that we now use the state space S. The meaning of the sets H n , H, H ∞ is analogous to that of H n , H, H ∞ . The strategies σ i (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) are defined in the same manner as in the sequential case (again, for deterministic moves we introduce the deterministic strategy functions σ i ).
Payoff of the concurrent SCPR game is defined in exactly the same manner as in the sequential case. Again, concurrent SCPR is a stochastic zero sum game and each player will try to maximize his expected payoff.
Sequential SCPR
In this section we establish that sequential SCPR has a value which can be computed by value iteration.
Theorem 3.1 Given some graph G = (V, E). For every s ∈ S 1 ∪ S 2 , the sequential SCPR game starting at s has a value v (s). The vector of values v = (v (s)) s∈S is the smallest (componentwise) solution of the following optimality equations:
Furthermore C 2 has a deterministic stationary Markovian optimal strategy and, for every ε > 0, C 1 has a deterministic stationary Markovian ε-optimal strategy.
Proof. It is easily checked that, for every graph G and every starting position s, the sequential SCPR game is a positive zero sum stochastic game. Hence (by [13, Theorem 4.4.1]) it possesses a value which (by [13, Theorem 4.4.3] ) is the smallest componentwise solution to the following system of optimality equations:
However, in each turn of the sequential SCPR game, one of the players has a single available action. For instance, when the state is s = x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , 1 , C 2 's action set can only be a 2 = x 2 . Hence in (9) we are taking the value of an one-shot game with the game matrix consisting of a single column. It follows that
which proves (7); (8) can be proved similarly. The existence of stationary Markovian optimal strategy for C 2 follows from [13, Corollary 4.4.2]. It is a deterministic strategy because for each state s ∈ S 2 the corresponding optimal C 2 move is the one minimizing (8) . Similarly, the existence of a stationary Markovian ε-optimal strategy for C 1 follows from [13, Problem 4.16] ; the strategy is deterministic, because for each state s ∈ S 1 the corresponding optimal C 1 move is the one maximizing (7) .
For the computation of the solution to (7)- (8) we have the following.
.. by the following recursion
Then, for every s ∈ S 1 ∪ S 2 , lim i→∞ v (i) (s) exists and equals v (s), the value of the sequential SCPR game played on G, starting from s. 
we get lim i→∞ v (i) = v (the value vector of Theorem 3.1). The equivalence of (13) to (10)- (12) is established by the argument used in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Remark 3.3
The significance of Theorem 3.1 is the following. Since SCPR is a positive zero sum stochastic game, it will certainly have a value, which satisfies the optimality equations (9); each equation of the system (9) involves the value of a one-turn game. However, the optimality equations can be expressed in the simpler form (7)- (8) which show that the values of the one-step games can be computed by simple max and min operations. (10)- (12) is computationally simpler (involves only max and min operations) than (13) . Note the similarity of (10)- (12) to the algorithm of [14] for determining the winner of a classic CR game. The similarity becomes stronger in the case of deterministic σ 3 
these parallel closely the algorithm of [14, p.2494].
Remark 3.5 Finally, note that Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 hold even when c (G) > 1; the reason for which we have previously required c (G) = 1 has to do with the appropriateness of the payoff function introduced in Section 2.
In particular, when c (G) > 1 our argument about C 2 's incentive to capture R does not hold necessarily (i.e., depending on σ 3 , C 2 may ensure payoff of 0 without ever capturing R); Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 still hold true.
Concurrent SCPR
In this section we establish that concurrent SCPR has a value which can be computed by value iteration. We first consider the case in which R is controlled by a general probability function σ 3 ("random robber") and then examine in greater detail the case in which σ 3 is oblivious deterministic ("oblivious deterministic robber").
Random Robber
The two main results on concurrent SCPR are immediate consequences of the more general results of [13] .
Theorem 4.1 Given some graph G = (V, E). For every s = x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ∈ S a , the concurrent SCPR game starting at s has a value v (s). The vector of values v = (v (s)) s∈S is the smallest (componentwise) solution of the following optimality equations
Furthermore, C 2 has a stationary Markovian optimal strategy and, for every ε > 0, C 1 has a stationary Markovian ε-optimal strategy.
Proof. 
Theorem 4.2 Given some graph
and v (1) , v (2) , ... by the following recursion
Then, for every s ∈ S a , lim i→∞ v (i) (s) exists and equals v (s), the value of the concurrent SCPR game played on G, starting from s. 
Oblivious Deterministic Robber
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 are "simpler" than Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, in the sense that the former do not involve the computation of matrix game values. We will now show that, when σ 3 is oblivious deterministic, we can obtain a similar simplification of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. Before presenting these results in rigorous form, let us describe them informally.
1. Suppose first that a game is played between a single cop and an oblivious deterministic robber. We will prove that there exists a stationary Markovian deterministic cop strategy σ * by which the cop can capture the robber in minimum time.
2. Next consider two cops and an oblivious deterministic robber. We will prove that the extension of σ * to SCPR is optimal for both cops. More specifically, neither cop loses anything by using it; and one of the two will capture the robber with probability one.
Let us now formalize the above ideas. We pick any graph G = (V, E) and any oblivious deterministic robber strategy σ 3 and keep these fixed for the remainder of the discussion. Further, let S denote the set of all functions
In other words, S is the set of legal stationary Markovian deterministic cop strategies for the "classic" CR game of one cop and one robber. Now pick some σ ∈ S and play the game with starting positions X 
Then we have the following.
Lemma 4.3 Given a graph G = (V, E) and an oblivious deterministic robber strategy σ 3 . Let
Now perform the following iteration for i = 1, 2, ... :
Then the limits lim It is easy to check (from the respective σ 3 values) that for s 1 = (2, 6, 4) and s 1 = (3, 5, 4) the capturing cop is C 1 , while for s 1 = (2, 5, 4) and s 1 = (3, 6, 4) the capturing cop is C 2 . Hence the game can be written out as the following (one-turn) matrix game It is easy to compute, using standard methods, that the optimal strategies for this game. C 1 must use Pr a 1 = 2 = Pr a 1 = 3 = . This implies that the optimal strategies σ * 1 and σ * 2 are randomized, despite the fact that σ 3 is deterministic (but not oblivious). Many similar examples can be constructed. The important point is this: when σ 3 is not oblivious, C 1 (resp. C 2 ) moves can influence future R moves and (since moves are performed simultaneously) this influence cannot be predicted by C 2 (resp. C 1 ).
Related Work
In this section we present work which is related to both the SCPR and other variants of the CR game.
We have already mentioned that the interested reader can find useful references to the CR literature in the book [20] by Nowakowski and Bonato. The CR literature is mainly oriented to graph theoretic and combinatorial considerations. Indeed CR can be seen as a combinatorial game. On the topic of combinatorial games, the reader can consult the introductory text [1] as well as the classic book (in four volumes) [5] by Berlekamp and Conway. We also find interesting combinatorial generalizations of the CR game in the papers [7, 8] by A. Bonato and G. MacGillivray.
We believe that "classic" game theory offers a natural (but not often used in the "mainstream" CR literature) framework for the analysis of CR games. In particular, as already seen, we consider SCPR as a stochastic game. Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [23] . A classic book on the subject is [13] , which also contains a rich bibliography; see also [18] .
A type of stochastic games which are especially related to CR games are recursive games, in which whenever a non-zero-payoff is received the play immediately moves to an absorbing state. Recursive games were introduced by Everett [12] . It is obvious that SCPR is a recursive game; while we have not used results from the recursive game theory in the current paper, we believe this may turn out to be a fruitful connection.
Let us now mention a construction which has been used in several "classic" CR papers [7, 8, 14] . Suppose that a "classic" CR game is played between one cop and one robber on the undirected graph G = (V, E). We now construct the game digraph D = (S, A), where the vertex set is S = V × V × {1, 2} and the arc set A encodes possible vertex-to-vertex transitions. Then a play of the CR game can be understood as a walk on D; the cop wins if he can force the walk to pass through a vertex of the form (x, x, i). Hence CR can be seen as a game in which the two players push a token along the arcs of the digraph. As pointed out in [7, 8] many CR variants and several other pursuit games on graphs (including the concurrent CR game) can be formulated in a similar manner.
It turns out that such "digraph games" have been studied by several researchers and the related literature is spread among many communities. The earliest such works of which we are aware is [4, 16] . Other early examples of this iterature are the papers [3, 11, 24] . But probably the most widespread application of this point of view is in the literature of reachability games [6] and, more generally, ω-regular games [17] . In a reachability game two players take turns moving a token along the arcs of a digraph; player 1 wants to place the token on one of the nodes of a subset of the digraph vertices while player 2 wants to avoid this event. In addition to "classic" sequential rechability games, many other variants have been studied, e.g., stochastic [9] , concurrent [2] , n-player [10] etc. The connection to CR games is obvious; it seems likely that the voluminous literature on reachability games contains results of interest to CR researchers.
Conclusion
We have introduced the game of selfish cops and passive robber (SCPR game) and established its basic properties, namely the existence of value and optimal strategies for both the sequential and concurrent variants; we have also provided algorithms for the computation of the aforementioned quantities. In the current paper we have examined qualitative variants of the game, i.e., these in which the goal of the cops is simply to capture the robber. In a forthcoming paper we will examine quantitative variants, in which the goal is to capture the robber in the shortest possible time.
Several additional issues merit further study and will be the subject of our future research. We have formulated SCPR as a zero-sum game; but reasonable formulations as a non-zero-sum game are also possible and we conjecture that these may lead to qualitatively different results. In addition, if we remove the assumption that the robber is passive and deal instead with the situation of two selfish robbers and a robber actively trying to avoid capture, we are left with a three-player game, which we intend to study in the future.
